Nowadays, it seems that all disciplines have to pretend being "scientific" in order to ensure their credibility. But the "social sciences", which aim at a better knowledge of the Human regarding what makes him its own kind, are they really sciences? Pretending to be so, do they not expose themselves to be qualified as "non-scientific" by the most critical minds in their time, just as did Karl Popper about psychoanalyses and theses on the psychological selfishness 1 ? In turn, is it possible to pretend that the "social sciences" are not sciences while stating that their dignity requires them to ask for another paradigm, a much more subtle one? The present contribution will try to answer to these questions. It will start with the proposal to replace the inappropriate name of "social sciences" by another one, much more respectful of the methods which should be theirs, which would be "disciplines of the subject".
Introduction
Nowadays, it seems that all disciplines have to pretend being "scientific" in order to ensure their credibility. Unfortunately it is true that the selfdeclaration of its scientific aspect grants to a subject an aura which will be likely to provide it with many benefits from its introduction into the university studies to the academic credits facilitation, passing by the recognition of an authority to its experts. Thus, some disciplines are tempted to claim abusively their scientific aspect 2 . Therefore, it is useful here to remember what science is and what ways the scientific method induces, before checking if the latter is well adapted to the matters of the "social sciences".
The scientific method
Each discipline can be analyzed following three main lines: its sector and its content (what it pretends to make one learn), its method (how does it work to do so?) and the limits which its sector and method provoke (what it cannot make one learn) 3 . Let's observe the characteristics of scientific methods now.
The scientific method requires the observance of various principles which are essential for the "withdrawal" of the subject who knows the subject that he is studying, in the apparently praiseworthy goal of avoiding to distort him and to observe him altering the results of his research with his a priori. These fundamental principles which legitimize the generalization made from singular observations consist in three requirements : (1) a high number of observation's statements of the phenomenon considered, (2) the reproducibility of the phenomenon observed in numerous and different conditions and (3) the absence of all observation's statement invalidating the law of general order induced by the concordance of numerous previous observations. However, by definition, the first two requirements can only deal with object, in other words to entities considered in their passive dimension, repeatable, modelisable. Therefore science, in its very method, can only consider objects or objectify what it observes. It methodically reduces the real, and can only lead to truncated readings, which thingify its object when it forgets that it is extracted or built up 4 . If one can accept its method in the light of the results that one can reach thanks to it, it is essential never to forget it, or it will remove its justification to the disciplinary approach: "disciplines ... are fully justified only if they do not obscure general realities" 5 .
Therefore the scientific approach of the past centuries confronts a passive object by definition to an allegedly neutral observer. This approach is highly criticized by the current approaches in advanced sciences such as particle physics. These disciplines have shown to what extent the observer changes the observed object by his sole observation. This was already the case in the past: the example of the thermometer which modifies and distorts the expected measure when immersed in the fluid which is supposed to indicate the temperature, is in all minds. This modification of the observed by the observation already invited to make a fundamental criticism of the objectivity of science, too often overlooked. But science at its present stage of consideration of the infinitely large and the infinitely small, and at a time when it must "create" its subject of observation, can no longer ignore this criticism. In parallel, the minds have evolved from scientific laws obsessed with the idea of an absolute determinism to the emergence of probabilistic type of laws. Karl Popper takes notice of this new paradigm in a significant way when he raises the objectivity as to the result -always provisional -of the critical intersubjectivity 6 . In doing so, he defines a discipline mainly not by its object or by a method which is designed as a set of processes ensuring the greatest objectivity possible, but by the state at a given time of a critical consensus between its practitioners.
It is perhaps not useless at this stage to recall in what sciences are not that much "objective" as it is believed, and to what extent their method voluntarily limits their field of experience.
The two movements of the scientific approach Every criticism on the "objectivity" of the scientific approach willing not to give in to a naive inductivism must deal with the ways which affect the two phases of the scientific method: the induction and verification.
The scientific approach is characterized by two complementary movements: the creation of general laws or of hypotheses and their verification. These two movements are akin to a movement of back and forth: the implementation of general laws from the observation of phenomena, in other words the evolution from the singular to the general stage, for the induction; and the probation of the general laws with the observation of phenomena having value of tests, passing from the general to the particular stage, for the verification. However, it is more difficult than one can imagine to describe this process without making reference to the a priori based essentially on a confusion of the logical and of the chronological, which would notably mean that the creation of laws is carried out before their verification. Let's start with the verification of the laws. Karl Popper has shown that, when a law is established, it is subject to the test of facts. When a fact refutes a theory, several new hypotheses are proposed. They in turn are subjects to the test of facts to invalidate them; the statement not rebutted is chosen as new theory, and so on. Therefore a theory is considered as true only to the extent that it is rebuttable, and that it is not yet disproved. In fact, scientific laws, just as any guiding principle, are not true, but rather confirmed in their pragmatic validity; only the projections authorized by the laws may be declared true 7 . Moreover, the validity of a scientific law is always perceived as temporary, since it is impossible to claim that it has successfully take the test of all the possible facts 8 . Talking about test of facts, it would be more appropriate to talk about measurement tests of the reality, since the scientific interpretations will operate not on facts, but on the measures of these facts, only apprehensible with the processes used. These measures may prove erroneous things or even not be significant for the research undertaken. They constitute an additional filter and are thus limitative of the reality.
In regard to the creation of laws, it implies the transition from the singular to the general plan or of the effect on the cause according to a process called induction. This changeover from actual observations to the statement of a general and abstract law is possible when the number of converging observations is important, that they have been carried out in a large number of different conditions and that no observation contradicts the generalization that is induced. But these rules do not justify a generalization, it must be seen only as a safeguard 9 , for at least two reasons: on the one hand, as it has been explained earlier, only a single observation would be enough to reverse the law and so to be invalidated, as it is impossible to claim to have done all the possible observations; on the other hand, the observations are not neutral and still depend on a prior understanding 10 , which is also as filter. That's why no passage of the effect on the cause can be regarded as a formal demonstration, but at best as a working hypothesis. Thus, it seems preferable to follow the statement of Paul Amselek according to the scientific rules and to see in them simple tools of identification and not the unveiling of "laws of nature" designed as a given necessary and fixed data, immanent to the structure of the world and the basis in hypothetical backstage 11 . Thus, the inductions have no probative value in themselves; they are just ideas which have to be subjected to the test of facts 12 . This point of view joins the aphorism according to which one can only find what he is looking for. In addition, the creation of laws is not only made by induction, starting from the observed phenomena, but it is also the result of the purely rational activity of the spirit: Pierre Delattre recalls that it is an aspect too-often neglected in the theoretical construction, while Albert Einstein, among other theorists, stressed that the removal to the facts played an essential role in this construction 13 . The process of creation of scientific laws is even more mysterious as it involves another dimension too often overshadowed by the positivists and the historians of science and ideas, but at the same time how important: the share of dreams, which conducts some of the greatest scientists to do their research as surely as do the methods: the example of Albert Einsteinhowever known to be a real determinist -reminds that science is built on a "powerful scientific imagination" 14 , due to his discovery of the theory of relativity which is linked to a dream he had in his youth, so he admitted. The examples of Willi Harman and Howard Rheingold show that he was not the only one, or rather the opposite 15 . Finally let's talk about how the process of abduction is highlighted by Charles Sanders Peirce: neither induction nor deduction, the abduction is "a process during which a hypothesis is generated, so that surprising facts may be explained"; it is, in other words, a form of intuition 16 . For Charles Sanders Peirce, only this process allows to make account of the conceptual "hops" operated by the more imaginative of the minds, and to "probe" the reality.
Therefore it is not possible to assert that "science is a construction purely logic built on facts" 17 , yet as the naive inductivistism and the radical positivism do. Instead, one must admit that the induction is a mysterious process, and that its ways of operating are not really known. The creation of laws and their verification appear as two movements of the scientific approach which seem to contribute to one another, recalling the classic problem of the chicken and egg.
The ways of any human knowledge All human knowledge -including the scientific one-is in turn composed of even more fundamental ways. The main one, in addition to the induction (which affects any syllogism), is related to its intentionality. Knowledge is neither neutral nor passive, it is always directed to its object; the knowledge of something, as it was already the case for the conscience to the scholastics, and it is this very overview which refers to the intentionality 18 . This is the merit of the theory of relativity of Albert Einstein; having reminded it to the scientists 19 . Thus knowledge is a representation in the strong sense, which means an "action that pictures things in a certain way" 20 . In other words, knowledge is a process and it is neither transparent -in this sense that it would be pure and a simple reproduction of the object in the subject-, nor much misleading -in this sense that it does not allow to reach an essential dimension of the object or to experience the reality in a coherent and adequate way. This "certain way" implies that one must take into account the psychological dimension of knowledge, in order to support the nature of the subject knowing as such. Highlighted by the Kantian categories, it was already present among Aristotle through the notion of common sense -which gives an account of the intertwining psychic of the five senses between them and a pre-training of the unity of the object sensed in the subject knowing it even before his apprehension by the intellect in the form of a concept. Taking the subjective dimension of knowledge into account turns out to be essential. Claire Petitmengin confirms this fact in the "cognitive sciences" sector:
According to the credo of the classical psychology, 'experimental', the only data regarded as scientific are observable and reproducible to the identical by a neutral, objective, external observer to its object of study. But the times are changing. Recently, a growing fringe of researchers in cognitive sciences have realized that in order to study the cognition, they can no longer be confined to the observable and recordable from the outside data, therefore that it is essential to take into account its subjective dimension, such as it is experienced from the inside 21 .
The subjective dimension of knowledge: here "subjective" has nothing to do with the relativistic meaning as it is often understood so, now at a time when people are obsessed with "objectivity". This term simply makes reference to one of the two key elements of knowledge, of any knowledge, and which explains that the observations are not neutral. Any true knowledge is at first and foremost a meeting between the things and a subject called to host their expressions without covering it up with prejudices, to "let it be so that they manifest themselves freely" to him, but also to enhance them in the stream of events that it receives 22 . The sole fact of watching implies a dimension of the active subject that we do not always admit in the phenomenon of the sensation, and which integrates its aspect of awareness. Thus the subjective dimension of the knowledge takes into accounts at least two key factors: the active approach of the subject to "let it be" and the raise of the awareness of some expressions rather than others; the necessary process of transformation which leads to the representation.
The epistemology and the "social sciences"
If the a priori which determine all human observation, concern also scientists -even when they apply the methods -and must find them vigilant on these issues specific to the constitution of any human knowledge, they threaten the actors of the "social sciences" and of the related disciplines such as law even more, because of their subject in itself. Indeed, these disciplines claim to be "scientific" and to study the human being as such, at the same time. Therefore they must manage two essential aspects which are not directly related to the exact sciences: on the one hand, the increasing nature of the intentionality and of the inevitable a priori which punctuate their approach, their object indicating no resistance to the concepts of the object of the classical experimental sciences -in other words, the capacity and the evidence of invalidation of physical phenomena; on the other hand, the obvious contradiction that there has to pretend to have a subject for object of study.
The first aspect consists in a point of vigilance: it is due to the increasing risk of a priori in the social research. Indeed, if the progress strictly scientific comes from the unexpected revealed by the experiments, which expose new facts or new measures of facts 23 , the intentionality inherent in all approach of knowledge is strengthened in the framework of the social research and risks even more to contribute to a naïve inductivism that its object returns necessarily the subject knowing in it itself. Then the critical social researcher will inevitably have to bear this characteristic if he wants to understand the human phenomena. As to the second aspect, it is related to the constitutive impossibility that there would be in studying scientifically the human being considered in what characterizes him the more, as to know its quality of subject. The human being must be apprehended as a subject to be able to take account of its radical surprising ability 24 , in other words of its capacity to be a source of its own expressions and to escape at least partially the social, cultural or historical determinations to which one is too often tempted to reduce him. First, it is appropriate to show how the experimentation of the "social sciences" can be distinguished from the one of the experimental sciences, despite the mathematical formalism that some of the latter thought necessary to adopt in order to give to their approach an appearance of accuracy and objectivity that they don't always have.
Confrontation with the scientific methods
Paul Jorion sums up very well the epistemological causes of the subject's objectification by the "social sciences" according to the economic theory of value:
The objectification is the progressive exclusion of all these elements that always make it difficult to produce a science in which the man is the object, or is linked to this object in an intimate way. Because science has its rules when it comes to describing behaviors and that there are rules more ancient and of a different nature when it comes to speaking about the behaviors of men, and that these two types of rules are apparently in contradiction. Science for example (when it copies -as often -its matters on those of the classical mechanics) explains the change by the action of a cause on a thing where it produces an effect: the strength of falling water turns the wheel of the millwhat Aristotle called the efficient cause -, whereas men explain the change they cause […] by the goal they want to achieve: thus, a home ends up being built up because throughout its construction, the bricklayer has kept [...] the project building it -in other words, what Aristotle called the final cause. "Because of" says Science in order to make account of the things that change. "For", "in order to", say the men when they are talking about their acts. Another difficulty is linked with the habit to consider the action of men as it is conceived by themselves in the perspective of the freedom that they grant themselves to do such thing or not, whereas science is used to looking at things in the perspective of the determinism: the possibility described by Laplace to fully and exactly destroy the state of the world in a future moment by the knowledge that one has at the present. The human freedom seems to ruin this hope.
Scientific experimentation is characterized in the facts by an intrusion and a dissection of the real, or even by an artificial creation of information thanks to specific technical conditions, either in order to allow the manifestation of phenomena which are not observable as such in the nature, or to ensure the absence of any exogenous interference in the results obtained. Given the character more and more "constructed" of the environments of observation, which prime example is the particle physics one, science seems currently facing the issue of the validity and relevance of the measures of the real which it records and performs. Surely this is not the case for the "social sciences", which not only claim that they do not create by their experiments of not observable phenomena in usual conditions, but on the contrary they are trying to provide new interpretations enlightening facts or situations which it is important that they be strictly complying with those of the everyday life, or it will remove any interest in these research and interpretations. It has to be added that they do not adopt the mathematics as the language and the logic allowing the expression the more subtle of their observations but they simply use statistics, fairly elementary for the most part 26 . This remark coincides with the one of Pierre Delattre when he exposes that very often the disciplines adopt of the mathematics only its syntax and ignore its semantic dimension 27 . However, the abstraction of the mathematical formalism seems far from being a mere intermediary between men and nature; unlike the laws set forth by the exact sciences, this formalism would be inseparable from the experience in quantum physics, more exactly it would constitute a condition of experience. If it is agreed to define reality as what resists to the experience, what is in one's possible field of experience -the concept of "resistance" here being opposed to "the unknowable" -, the mathematical abstraction would then be fully part of the reality in this sense that it resists also in its way to the experience, both by its requirement for internal consistency and by the need to ensure its adequacy with experimental data 28 . One sees that this recognition almost ontological of the mathematical formalism is far from being adopted by the "social sciences", and that the superficial use they make of it can be even better identified.
Rethinking the concept of "scientific approach" or taking the measure of liberty? One can wonder, following Jean-François Malherbe and Jean Ladrière's results, if it is not time to rethink the whole concept of the "scientific approach" and to see in it only a particular modality of interpretation of the real among others 29 . One comes to the same conclusion if the objectification that any scientific method necessarily applies to the real is kept in mind, and thus its fundamental character to reduce reality, whatever the merits that one acknowledges to its progress. However, given the vision culturally wrong of the "objectivity" of the science on the one hand, and of our ignorance of the characteristics of the subject considered as such on the other hand, it may be preferable to refuse the term "science" to the "social sciences" and to give them back their dignity by reshaping the concept of "sujéité" rather than by recasting the concept of "science" which would probably be confined to a circle of insiders. Because this is about restoring the "social sciences" in their real dignity, which is certainly not in the scientific objectivity. Thus, it would be appropriate to call them "disciplines of the subject", an expression which will be used below in lieu of the "social sciences".
The radical impossibility that there is in observing scientifically the human being in its fundamental reality does not belong to the essential distinction observing subject / observed object, which underlies the "classic" scientific approach. It is rather in the very nature of the human being that it seems necessary to find the deep causes of it, more exactly in its subject's characteristic -not to be understand in a relative manner, as knowing subject, but in the way Jean-André Nisole calls its "sujéité", in other words its nature of free subject. There is no scientific observation without intrusion, while the psychic phenomena escape to any intrusion 30 , at a point that the project, the "social sciences" in its own, of observing scientifically their 'object', the human being, results in the impossibility for them to reach it in its very reality. Michel Henry has particularly well demonstrated, through his criticism of science, to what extent the objectivity of the "social sciences" deprives them of their object 31 . It goes way more far than admitting the "sensitivity" of the observed object to the influence of the observer or his "unpredictability" in the physics' meaning about the behavior of quanta, because this "sensitivity" or this "unpredictability" of the object are not the result of a goodwill, an affectivity or of a psyche 32 . As Paul Amselek recalls after Martin Heidegger:
Freedom has nothing to do with the equations of uncertainty of the quantum mechanics. [...] the indeterminacy of the things of the world, which means the impossibility for the human spirit to submit its occurrence to a scientific treatment, and more particularly to develop theoretical laws providers of certainties on them, has nothing to do with human freedom, with the faculty of self-control which the human being is endowed with: this ontological attribute of the human must not be confounded [...] with the possibilities that the world offers to be provided by the reason, to be put into operation by it. 33 Thus, the methods of the disciplines of the subject stand out clearly from those of the exact sciences. To the contrary, there is no point of method in the strict sense for the disciplines of the subject. In the field of the fundamental questions specific to these disciplines, it seems that there is no applicable formula, but a "path" for the researcher in their company, a "mutual accompaniment". Jean-André Nisole teaches that "the review of an idea demands that we remain with it" in order to greet it and to permeate with it, in other words to experience it 34 . This invitation to let the ideas "go down" in us, respecting the time for internalizing and of maturation, allows in the first place to apply in this very particular framework the essential advice of Fontenelle which consists in being sure of the fact before "chasing the cause" 35 ; thus it takes account of the reflective nature of the study of the human being by the man, in other words of the real reference to itself that it causes. This approach, which should be the very characteristic of the disciplines of the subject, if it is not scientific in the strict sense of the term, still remains rational and deeply coherent; only this one considers the human being in all its dignity, and this fact taken into account is the basis in its turn for the dignity of the disciplines which restore it. On the contrary, it is the fact to imagine that knowledge can only be scientific, in other words that it can only adopt the own method of the physical sciences, which downgrades the disciplines that have made the human being their center of interest.
Science and rationality: the example of the economy As numerous thinkers have shown, including Jürgen Habermas, it is essential not to confuse science and rationality. Earlier, it has been explained that the very characteristic of an objective observation is to be reproducible, an approach which necessarily objectifies the observed. In addition, the characteristic of the scientific laws is to allow, by generalization, a cause and effect relationship between two sets of objective facts, which results in their ability to predict events not yet observed. Hence the relationship between the variation of the ambient temperature in a room and the expansion of a piece of metal: without it being necessary to measure the volume of the piece of metal for the infinity of ambient temperatures possible. However, it should be noted that the predictive nature of scientific laws does not constitute an essential condition of their validity in itself -indeed, they simply have to be refutable -, although their faculty to anticipate phenomena which had not been yet observed give them -at least temporarily -an undeniable consecration.
However, if one takes the example of the economy, without doubt the most mathematically formalized of all the "social sciences", it must be admitted that the laws of this discipline do not respond to its criteria by nature, so that in economics the forecast is "quasi-impossible" and can even be related to "the sham" 36 . For Bernard Maris, "those who claim the contrary are quacks" 37 . However, a large number of economists argue the contrary and establish numerous forecasts, above all calculated, in a positivist vision that Milton Friedman for example has openly professed, in particular in his book Essays in Positive Economics 38 . The latter goes even beyond "the sham" affirming that the veracity of the hypotheses doesn't really matter, "provided the fact that they more or less work and allow to make forecasts". After him, Hal Varian, the author of the Economics Manual the most sold in the U.S., is going as far as asserting that "a wrong theory still can help to understand the phenomena" 39 . However, the sole fact of claiming the existence of "laws" in the context of the disciplines of the subject is a mystification 40 .
The Economic "science" is at least openly thought upstream as the projection of the laws of physics in the field of human exchanges, making it a true social physics. Philip Mirowski says in his book with the evocative
title, More heat than light -Economics as social physics, Physics as Nature's Economics:
William Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras, Vilfredo Pareto, Francis Edgeworth, Irving Fischer and many others were not hiding: the usefulness as they understood it was based on the potential energy of the classical mechanics, as well as their favorite mathematical device, the principles of extremum. 41 These principles of physics not have simply inspired these economists; they have literally conditioned their approach. Philip Mirowski says also that "they have almost virtually copied the model term-by-term and symbol to symbol." This Economics' fantastic layer, as one could call it, on Physical science explains that the concepts in Economics not only of law or of usefulness, but also of balance and its so-called self-regulation are highly suspicious. Starting with some fundamental reflections of the Austrian School's representatives, Philippe Simonnot shows that the economic laws are to be distinguished from the physical laws as they do not establish relations between the facts, but they deal with actions -according to Murray Rothbard 42 -or better, with choices -according to Jörg Guido Hülsmann 43 . That is where their inability to forecast calculated consequences of the economic actions would come from, although choices, and therefore the human action, are governed by laws. Is it consequently possible to talk about laws in the field of choices, which are the hallmark of human freedom? That is the problem Emile Durkheim was facing in sociology when he dealt with the phenomenon of suicide:
Human freedom can be visualized in the regularity that appears when it is envisaged in its collective aspect, in the quasi-constancy that statistics show. Whatever may be the extent of the freedom which intervenes in the decision to commit suicide, each year a roughly stable proportion of the population make such a decision. Therefore nothing is opposed to the fact that the explanation reconciles the inevitability of the physical world and the freedom of men. 44 However, it is not certain that keeping making statistics will so easily enable to merge human freedom and the development of laws which relates to this latter. Although they claim to take note of the past only, statistics are in fact almost always implicitly envisaged in a predictive way, thus placing the acts that they relate in a narrow vision where the future is sentenced to be a projection of the past only. Does not the concept of law in itself suggest a certain regularity, while the very characteristic of freedom is to be possibility, a window on the unknown 45 ? The sole fact of pointing at the regularity of collective behaviors can make them inevitable and eradicate all inclination to explore alternative approaches; in addition, their simple observation does not reveal anything about their causes, whose variation can deny the apparent regularity of the effects observed. Therefore the difficulty to implement laws on choices seems to continue unabated, even if the formulation of rules or the observation of tendencies enlightening behavioral mechanisms can in principle be relevant.
Jörg Guido Hülsmann points out the fact that any choice includes not only its realization under the form of an observable human action, but also the goal which motivated that action and the options abandoned, in other words the branches of the alternative which have been neglected in favor of the one that has been implemented and which Hülsmann qualifies as "counter-facts". This invisible dimension of our choices is close to the "opportunity cost", which designates the market value of what one abandons when he makes a choice. This concept is particularly useful to the economists when they try to evaluate the goods and services which, as not being accessible on the market, do not have a price: the price of an hour of leisure time corresponds to the income that one could have been earning if dedicated to a professional activity, or even to the consumer goods to which one renounces by not working 46 . Still according to Jörg Guido Hülsmann, the laws that rule the human action would describe as follow "the relations that a choice establishes between what exists and what could have existed if the choice had not been made", or rather if it had been different. They set "what exists in reality in the terms of what could have existed" 47 . It is how the "economic laws" describe more the actual reality than the simple tendencies which materialize in a distant horizon doand which may never even happen 48 . They are also distinguished from the simple hypotheses which have to undergo the test of facts in order to be validated, which means that like the axioms, the "counter-factual" laws are absolutes and can neither be disproved or proven by the experience, but only verified on the plan of the counterfactual reasoning 49 .
Let's take the example of the economic law according to which any increase in the money supply leads to an increase in prices. This law, as Philippe Simonnot teaches, is not only applied to textbook cases purged of all the complexities of real life -often introduced by the famous expression "all other things being equal" -, but to any real situation, whatever it may be, in other words even to those where, for any reason, the increase of the money supply does not result in the increase of prices expected in a visible manner: despite all that one must think in this case that the increase in the money supply has exercised a real action on prices, but that the inflation has been counterbalanced in its whole or in part by a cause that has not been perceived, so that without this action on the money supply, prices would have been even lower than those observed. These universal laws, though all incapable to set positive forecasts, remain excellent guides for political action. One could say the same about the three conditions required by the model of the perfect competition which are the atomicity of the actors, the homogeneity of the products and the transparency of the information.
Above all, it is the very nature of the economic rules to forbid getting them confuse with the laws in the scientific sense of the term. These rules are in no way the result of an induction completed from a series of observed facts; all the more they are hypotheses, postulates necessarily impregnated with a human vision which is not neutral. The utilitarian thesis which serves as a reference to an entire branch of the economy is a strong testimony of this fact.
Despite all some economists, although aware that the economy is not predictive, claim the character "scientific" of their discipline 50 . When the strictly speaking scientific laws should be able to be contradicted by the facts, maybe it should be seen in their claim the effect of a confusion between science and rationality. What is not scientific is not necessarily irrational. When Karl Popper noticed that the psychoanalysis admitted contradictory statements with respect to the same subject, which prevent the invalidation of these statements by the facts, he concluded that the irrefutable nature of the psychoanalysis makes it non-scientific. 51 This ostracism seems however to invalidate the psychoanalysis as being non-rational to him, which appears excessive. The situation is very different if it is accepted that one can agree on the contradictions of some psychoanalytic statements on the human -contradictions that could be collected within all the disciplines of the subject -because of its very "sujéité" 52 . Because of this, these contradictions can certainly refuse to these disciplines the status of "science", but they could also, after having a better look, not getting in conflict with the principle of non-contradiction, which preserves their status of rational knowledge. The term "discipline" very clearly representing a rational characteristic, can thus be applied to the "social sciences".
This fact clarified, it remains that the economic laws, all rational as they are, cannot be denied or proven by the experience, but only in terms of reasoning, whether or not it is "counter-factual". It shows that they are even more subject to the influence of ideologies of all kinds. From this results three consequences: (1) the "demonstrations" carried out by the economists are not eligible to have a scientific characteristic, all the more they prove the internal consistency of the a priori principles which they start from and the "resistant" nature of the mathematical logic, but not their adequacy to reality; (2) so one should remain particularly vigilant in regards to their possible ways, this discipline being very sensitive to the a priori of its practitioners, and submit them to a strong criticism in lieu of perceiving, as it is too often the case nowadays, the expression of an absolute truth which suffers no objection; (3) Finally, the economic discourse has naturally to undergo a criticism not only from the angle of the internal logic but also under the one, more general, of the philosophical reasoning. This seems to come up against the autonomous tendencies of the economy as a mathematically standardized discipline. Thus it is possible to assert that the economic truth changes depending on its framework. Philippe Simmonot brings the best proof of it when he admits that the model of the perfect competition "is mathematically confirmed" 53 , before showing its "absurdity" and its "possible derivatives" 54 . Even better: after having endeavored to demonstrate the futility of the model ... he comes the conclusion that, given the impossibility of formulating the market into equations, it is impossible to reach this state of competition, and that, in this case, it is preferable ... to let the marketplace be: "it is better to count on the independent and concurrent efforts of many people, what to make happen? Precisely what we cannot know" 55 . When one recalls that this is the model of the perfect competition which has served as the basis for the ideology of the self-regulation of the market, he realizes how too often the economy manages to "demonstrate" its theses, regardless of the path taken by his reasoning, which makes it, once again, irrefutable, and especially extremely sensitive to ideologies.
For example, if one resumed the economic reasoning regarding the opportunity costs, he could see in it an approach that is at once limited and reductive of the human freedom. A choice is not always limited to the comparison between an option and the counter-facts constituting the alternative -in other words it does not always fit into a relative context -but it may be driven by an inner necessity, regardless of its price; it is the question of the value which arises here, as well as the theses of the psychological egoism, legacy of the XVIII th century, from which the economists do not seem released yet. Thus the choice to spend an hour to rest or to meditate is not always the result of an internal debate between the advantage of the "leisure" that one grants himself and the shortfall that it induces, but it can be made on the basis of a vital need to find himself "on his own", sweeping away any other consideration and calculation. This is the case for all the decisions made in function of the "to be" more than the "to have" one, by a subject wishing to succeed in his life more than to succeed in life; such decisions are more numerous than one might think, and are even more important as they condition in their turn a cascade of more daily choices. In general, any comparison between the two situations is not tantamount to a calculation of opportunity; in other words, the economic calculation remains necessarily secondary in the very field of the choices, and reduces its prospects. To ignore that some life decisions may prevail over any consideration of economic order, is certainly having a short horizon. As some grand-mothers say: "at the end of your life, you rarely regret not having worked more, but rather of not having spent more time with those you love".
In the end, the biggest complaint which could be opposed to the scientific inclinations of the economy is that it claims having a descriptive and factual approach, while it works on a normative level of non-critical manner, under the influence of pre-established ideas that it has -or wants to have -of the human being. Therefore liberals have been able to go from the concept of usefulness of the trade announced by Adam Smith to a reductionist and utilitarian ideology without any criticism worthy of the name 56 . Once again it is observed that the induction is revealed to be the most problematic phase in the scientific approach -the latter which the economy claims to follow.
Having said so, the economy can now inform one on the rules which govern the human choices, as the desire of each of the actors is exceeded at the scale of the market. Yet there must be an agreement on the economic system of reference, basis of the concept of market, and not to narrow the approach of economic exchanges in the framework of the current system of reference, the capitalism, of which very singular, unequal and particularly reducing aspects will be developed bellow. The economic choice, when based on human freedom, relies necessarily on the "sujéité" of the actor, and this is fundamentally why, it will never be fully predictable. Thus the approach by the "sujéité" of actors enables a deep change of method, applicable to disciplines of the human being. Abraham Maslow already advocated the adoption of two complementary epistemologies, depending on the context:
All the sciences, all the knowledge, can they be conceptualized as resulting from an affectionate or loving relationship between the knowing and the known? What would the benefits be for us to establish this epistemology side by side with the one which prevails today in the "objective science"? Can we use both simultaneously? My sense is that we can and must use the two epistemologies according to the requirements of the situation. To me, they are not contradictory but one feeds into the other. 57 To Abraham Maslow, the point was not to deny the scientific tradition, but to make it complete: "Let me be clear about this: I am trying to expand science, not to destroy it. It is not necessary to choose between experience and abstraction. Our task is to integrate them." 58 However, his reference to an "affectionate and loving relationship" seems too imprecise in order to serve as a real guide, and the term of empathy used by Jeremy Rifkin 59 is hardly clearer. But the Abraham Maslow's approach presents the advantage of showing the need of two complementary epistemologies, which should be harmonized in function of a superior perspective in order to better understand the "requirements of the situation" justifying the use of one or the other. An attempt to transdisciplinarity cannot be unseen; especially in this approach where the profound unity linking all the elements composing the real together is made a big deal. It deals with taking into account that each element belongs to a whole, and to make the approach as such, instead of maintaining a superficial division which, under the pretext of "objectivity", actually denies the deal on which is based any experience.
Therefore, the "affectionate and loving relationship" advocated by Abraham Maslow should be clarified, and especially further developed. It is to take into account the observed in all its dimensions, to reach it in its very unity, at its root, and, especially, in all its possible ways. Because if the reality is not determined, the observation which does not pay a constant attention to the unexpected and to the multiple possible answers of the observed necessarily conditions the reality, and by limiting it, distorts it. This capacity to be, that it is a need to understand and to live in conscience, is the "sujéité", according to the neologism proposed by Jean-André Nisole 60 . To take into account the profound nature of both the observer and the observed -in other words their "sujéité" -is to deeply change their relation and make it more respectful, while starting from a more visible position and therefore more critical.
It is now time to clarify the concept of "sujéité", and to capture its dynamics.
The "sujéité"
The "sujéité" of the human being is what characterizes him not as knowing subject face to its object of study, but more profoundly, as source at least partial of his own "being in the world".
Characteristics of the "sujéité"
What are the characteristics of this "sujéité"? Jean-André Nisole numbered three main elements 61 :
The man is possibility , always at the crossroads, in other words free -as to his ontological status, as to know his faculty to determine himself in his inner-self -rather than unpredictable , so that his forms of future existence should not be confined in the description of his past actions;
The man is being of relation because "we can only genuinely realize our essence through the relation with others" since "we express ourselves to us [...] thanks to the different relationships we have with the Other" 62 ; thus the Other can enable us to get deep in contact with our self-being without any intrusion, as a catalyst would do; however, the situations of scientific experimentations prevent the person to get the space allowing him to be fully deployed, and cause the crystallization of some of its manners ;
Finally, the man is inscribed in time, not submitted to it in the same way as any physical body, but in the very manner of the subjects, in the sense that its present is impregnated with its past recollections and with projections that the future inspires to his imaginary. Michel Develay sums it up in his own words: "we look at the world with our history and not with our eyes" 63 .
It is probably worth stopping a moment on these three points. The man is possibility: too often the social "sciences" would like one to believe that the rules induced by their observations would be inherent to the human being and impose on him in such a way that the behavior of one person could be defined by all of these requirements; however Paul Amselek, as said earlier, shows how the determinism is the result of a double mystification, not only on the side of science, but also on the side of freedom. This double mystification in its turn suggests a criticism of the Kantian ethics as based on laws stated as universal and pre-existing to the individual, of which application becomes rigid and does not allow the adaptation according to a values' hierarchy, the empowerment of the person located at the highest degree 64 More specifically, any non-critical statistical description is objectifying and not only it crystallizes the person studied in "average" behaviors, but it also places the observer in a wait for results answering a predetermined and reductive questioning, which locks the observed population in the image of his own past rather than it opens to him the prospects of what it could be once "revealed" to itself or, taking the example of the Socratic image, "delivered" itself; such a model facilitates by its closing a control approach more than a free one. Moreover it reverses the process of "transindividuation" by which the individual psychic behaviors contribute in principle to the formation of the collective behaviors; the uses of statistics and of profiling the individuals tend on the contrary to "freeze them in a behavior by confining them in a category of collective behaviors" 65 . In Reggio Emilia, an Italian village, Loris Malaguzzi has worked to develop a pedagogy particularly respectful of the child's sujéité. Thus he didn't see the child as a stacker, but as a being who must experience childhood, and who's teaching skills for the adult must be acknowledged; then adults and children co-construct themselves by communicating and discover that learning is a cooperative activity 66 .
In fact, any possibility of emergence is paid by the acceptance of knowledge of the world and of each of its elements doomed to remain fundamentally incomplete. In this sense, Maître Eckhart has developed, besides his well known negative theology, a negative cosmology (the world is not completed, so one cannot say everything about it) coupled with a negative anthropology, which corresponds to the recognition of the sujéité in the human 67 .
The man is being of relation: the following experience will be taken as an example; it was a mother who, observing the aggressiveness of her child towards herself after the departure of his game companion, first thought that this attitude was directed against her, before realizing what was happening. Then all she had to do was to calmly ask her child if he was reacting like this because he was sad to be alone so that the child understood the origins of his deep feeling, and could live it more adequately throwing himself in the arms of his mother. Would have the simple observation of the aggressiveness of the child revealed the true nature and the cause of the deep feelings of the child, or his ability to get in contact with them and to adapt his behavior accordingly? Does not this questioning of the child by his mother reveal and deepen his autonomy of subject? Does not this autonomy constitute an essential dimension of the child as a human being? Nevertheless, isn't it escaping to any analysis or study which would not be preceded by an open listening and encouragement to hear the rumors sleeping in our inner-self? By contrast, are not the scientific analyses based on reproducible behaviors, which mechanical and predictable characteristic seems to be opposed to the development of an original and suitable behavior of a proper autonomous subjects?
Toward a "generalized epistemology" In his article entitled Interdisciplinary (Knowledge), Georges Gusdorf emits a major complaint against the interdisciplinary researches in social "sciences", that of having lost, along the exploitation of this new approach, "the human form as knot of meanings" 68 . Perhaps there should be seen, more than the difficulty of the disciplines to communicate between themselves, an effect of the loss of the "sujéité", the quest for an objective reality that have prompted these "sciences" to ignore a subjectivity awkwardly assimilated to subjectivism. And has not the constitution of the sociological tradition in the XIX th century been established on a "disallowance quasi-general of the subjectivity thought as illusion and the rejection of the interiority of the individual subject stated as abstract or empty "? 69 In order to take account of this "sujéité" Jean-André Nisole invites one to adopt a "generalized epistemology", in other words an epistemology which, in opposition to the classic or restrictive epistemology, "takes seriously the distinction subject/object" 70 and expects the subject to provide himself for the answers it questions him. To do so, it asks him by pulses , in other words by a real interaction capable of unveiling his profound nature, made of potential, like a photographic developer, rather than by observation/dissection , like any classic scientific method; in other words, it proceeds by inviting to accomplish his nature to be free rather than by findings , always reductive at this level of reality, since they do not take account of possible developments of the subject nor of the convertible characteristic of the world by the subjects. This epistemology initiates a process all oriented in the realization of the subject for himself, towards a "no longer being" which provokes his very form, in what it has of unique, knowing that any subject is only really knowable for himself and the other to the extent of his own fulfillment. It imposes a subtle game, which must at the same time avoid the projections of the intervener and the objectifications of science, a provision of being which make the differences prevailing on the similarities, the possible on the past, the shifting on the frozen; the only comparable situation, albeit for other causes, is the one experienced by the quantum physics, the "limited" nature of which do not allow it to rely on a observable "subject" without a criticism supported by its approach.
Conclusion
Only the epistemology of the subject can take account of the specificities of the disciplines of the subject; it invites one to make use of the theory of the general knowledge and of criticism rather than specific methods with an exact science. If we were not that much idolaters of science, we would probably see that this approach restores their dignity both to the human being and to the disciplines of the subject which investigate him, while acknowledging the difficulties inherent in their program.
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